A distributed secret sharing system is considered that consists of a dealer, n storage nodes, and m users. Each user is given access to a certain subset of storage nodes where it can download the data. The dealer wants to securely convey a specific secret sj to user j via storage nodes, for j " 1, 2, . . . , m, in such a way that no user gets any information about other users' secrets in an information-theoretic sense. To this end, we propose to study protocols where the dealer encodes secrets into several secret shares and loads them into the storage nodes. Given a certain number of storage nodes we find the maximum number of users that can be served in such protocols and construct schemes that achieve this. We further define two major properties for such distributed secret sharing systems; communication complexity is defined as the total amount of data that needs to be downloaded by users in order to reconstruct their secrets; and storage overhead is defined as the total amount of data loaded by the dealer into the storage nodes normalized by the total size of secrets. Lower bounds on minimum communication complexity and storage overhead are characterized given any n and m. Furthermore, we construct distributed secret sharing protocols, under certain conditions on the system parameters, that attain these lower bounds thereby providing schemes that are optimal in terms of both the communication complexity and storage overhead.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret sharing, introduced by Shamir [1] and Blakely [2] , is central in many cryptographic systems. They have found applications in cryptography and secure distributed computing such as secure interactive computations [3] , [4] , secure storage [5] , [6] , generalized oblivious transfer [7] , [8] , and threshold cryptography [9] , [10] . A secret-sharing scheme involves a dealer, who has a secret, a set of users, and a collection A of subsets of users, which is called the access structure. A secret-sharing scheme for the access structure A is a scheme for distributing the secret by the dealer among the users while guaranteeing (1) secret recovery: any subset in the access structure A can recover the secret from its shares, and (2) collusion resistance: for any subset not in A, the aggregate data of users in that subset reveals no information about the secret.
Most cryptographic protocols involving secret sharing assume that the central user, called the dealer, has a direct reliable and secure communication channel to all the users. In such settings, it is assumed that once the dealer computes the shares of secret, they are readily available to the users. In many scenarios, however, the dealer and users are nodes of a large network. In general, the communication between the dealer node and users can be through several relay nodes, as in a relay network or through intermediate network nodes, as in a network coding scenario. Alternatively, in a distributed storage scenario, the dealer can be thought as a master node controlling a certain set of servers or storage nodes, while each user has access to a certain subset of servers.
In this paper, we consider the later scenario. In particular, the system model is shown in Figure 1 . The dealer is considered as a central entity that controls a given set of servers, also referred to as storage nodes, and can load data to them. Alternatively, in an application concerning multiple-access wireless networks, one can think of middle nodes, sitting between the dealer and users, as resource elements in different time or frequency while each user has access to a certain subset of resource elements. We further consider a multi-user secret sharing scenario, in the sense that there is a designated secret, independently generated for each user, to be conveyed to that user. We require the secret sharing protocol to be secure implying that each user does not get any information, in the information-theoretic sense, about other users' secrets. The system model, security condition, and our approach to construct secret sharing protocols for this system are described next.
A. System model
A distributed secret sharing system, shown in Figure 1 , consists of a dealer, n storage nodes, and m users. The goal of this system is to enable the dealer to securely convey a specific secret to each user via storage nodes. In this system model: a) For each user j, A j Ă rns, where rns def " t1, 2, 3, ..., nu, denote the set of all storage nodes that user j has access to. The set A j is referred to as the access set for the user j. For each i P A j , user j can read the entire data loaded into node i. Let A def " tA j : j P rmsu (1) denote the set of all access sets, which is called the access structure. b) Storage nodes are passive; they do not communicate with each other. Also, the users do not communicate with each other. c) Let s j P F q denote the secret for user j. Also, s j 's are uniformly distributed and mutually independent. In other words, the vector of s j 's is full entropy. d) The dealer has access to all the storage nodes but it does not have direct access to the users. We aim at designing distributed secret sharing protocols to encode the secrets into secret shares, and distribute them in the storage nodes in such a way that: 1) Each user j can successfully reconstruct its designated secret s j , and 2) User j does not get any information about s l , for any l ‰ j. This is defined more precisely as follows.
Definition 1: A distributed secret sharing protocol (DSSP) is a bundle of pA , E, Z nˆh , Dq, where i) A is the access structure as defined in (1) . ii) E : F m q Ñ F h q is an encoding function, for some h ě m which will relate to the storage overhead of the system as specified later. The input to the encoding function E is s " ps 1 , s 2 , ..., s m q t which is the vector of all secrets. The output y " Epsq is the vector of all data to be distributed and stored in the storage nodes. Let y " py 1 , y 2 , . . . , y h q t . iii) Z " rz i,r s nˆh and z i,r " 1 if y r is stored in i-th storage node, otherwise z ir " 0. This is referred to as the storing matrix. Let y j denotes the vector of all data stored in nodes indexed by elements of the access set A j . iv) D is a collection of m decoding functions D j : F |yj | q Ñ F q , for j P rms, such that D j py j q " s j . In other words, dealer n storage nodes m users Fig. 1 : System model each user is able to successfully reconstruct its own secret. This is referred to as the correctness condition. The protocol is also secure in the information theoretic sense, i.e., @j, l P rms, l ‰ j : Hps l |y j q " Hps l q.
(2) In order to evaluate the efficiency of DSSPs, we focus on two important aspects, namely storage overhead and communication complexity.
Note that the total number of F q -symbols stored in the storage nodes is
The storage overhead, denoted by SO, of DSSP is defined as follows:
Note that the correctness condition must be satisfied for m mutually independent and uniformly distributed secrets. Therefore, k 1 ě m and consequently, SO ě 1.
Let c j denote the total number of symbols that the user j needs to download from the storage nodes in the access set A j in order to reconstruct s j . Note that c j ď |y j |, since user j may not need to download all its accessible data. Then the communication complexity C is defined as follows:
B. Main Results
We first consider the problem of finding the maximum number of users that can be served in a DSSP given a certain number of storage nodes. This maximum number is derived using a necessary and sufficient condition on access sets in a DSSP that relates to Sperner families in combinatorics. We further present a method for constructing DSSPs that serve maximum number of users.
For a given number of users m and number of storage nodes n, a DSSP with minimum communication complexity C defined in (4) is called a communication-efficient DSSP. We solve a discrete optimization problem to provide a lower bound on the minimum communication complexity. We further construct DSSPs that are communication-efficient, i.e., they achieve the minimum possible communication complexity when m is a binomial coefficient of n.
We further construct communication-efficient DSSPs that also achieve the optimal storage overhead of one, under the same condition that m is a binomial coefficient of n. In the proposed schemes no external randomness is required and the total size of data to be stored on storage nodes is equal to the total size of secrets, provided that the users' secrets are full entropy. Consequently, this provides the optimal storage overhead of one.
C. Shamir's Scheme and Related Works
The pk, tq secret sharing scheme provided by Shamir in [1] is a method to produce k secret shares given a secret s P F q in such a way that a) the secret s can be reconstructed given any t or more of the secret shares, and b) knowledge of any t´1 or fewer secret shares does not reveal any information about s, in the information-theoretic sense.
and uniformly at random, and then evaluated over k distinct elements of F q . Given any t secret shares P pxq is interpolated and is uniquely determined. Then s " P p0q is reconstructed. We refer to this process as Shamir's secret decoder.
There are several previous works that have considered Shamir's scheme in the context of networks [11] and distributed storage systems [12] , [13] . In these works, there is only one secret, as in the original Shamir's scheme, to be distributed to users either as nodes of a network [11] or as users of a distributed storage system [12] , [13] , in a collusion-resistant way. However, we consider a multi-user secret sharing scenario, where there is one designated secret for each user, and the secret shares are distributed over a set of storage nodes. Also, in our constructed schemes we guarantee that each user does not get any information about other users' secrets, thereby providing security in a multi-user sense.
II. DSSP WITH MAXIMUM NUMBER OF USERS
In this section, we consider the following problem: What is the maximum possible number of users that can be served in a DSSP given a certain number of storage nodes? A necessary and sufficient condition on access sets in a DSSP is shown which relates to Sperner families in combinatorics. This relation is invoked to present a method for constructing DSSPs that serve maximum number of users.
Lemma 1: For a DSSP with access structure A defined in (1):
for all j, l P rms with j ‰ l. Proof: : Assume to the contrary that A j Ă A l for some j ‰ l. Therefore, the entire accessible data by user j can also be accessed by user l. Since user j can retrieve s j by the correctness condition, user l can also retrieve s j . This means the security condition is violated and the protocol is not a DSSP as defined in Definition 1, which is a contradiction.
Collections of subsets A satisfying the condition of Lemma 1 are well-studied combinatorial objects. Such a set A is called a Sperner family [14] . For any Sperner family A we have [14] |A | ďˆn tn{2u˙ ( 6) and more generally a necessary condition for existence of a Sperner family with a k subsets of size k, for k P rns, is that [15] k"n ÿ k"0 a k n k˘ď 1.
Since the number of users m " |A | , (6) implies an upper bound on m, i.e., m ďˆn tn{2u˙ ( 8) Next, we use Shamir's secret sharing scheme to construct a DSSP when the access structure A is a Sperner family. Let t j " |A j |. In this construction, a pt j , t j q Shamir's secret sharing scheme is used independently for each user j, both in the encoding of s j by the dealer and decoding it by user j. Such DSSP is denoted by S-DSSP{A , n}. In other words, the condition in Lemma 1 is a sufficient condition for existence of a DSSP. More specifically, S-DSSP{A , n} is specified as follows:
i) A is a Sperner family consisting of subsets of rns.
..`t j and τ 0 " 0; and A j " ta 1,j , a 2,j , . . . , a tj ,j u. All other entries of Z are zero. iv) D j is the pt j , t j q Shamir's secret decoder, for j P rms. Lemma 2: S-DSSP{A , n} is a DSSP satisfying all properties in Definition 1.
Proof: S-DSSP{A , n} assigns a t j -subset of rns to user j. It encodes s j into t j secret shares using Shamir's scheme with the threshold t j and random seeds generated independently from other users. It then stores one share on each node in A j as specified by Z. Clearly, each user can reconstruct its secret by invoking Shamir's secret decoder. Also, Shamir's scheme guarantees (2) since A is a Sperner family and consequently, no user other than user j has access to all of its t j shares. Therefore, S-DSSP{A , n} is a DSSP satisfying all properties in Definition 1.
We can pick a Sperner family A with the maximum size |A | "`n tn{2u˘a nd then construct a S-DSSP{A , n}. This satisfies all properties of a DSSP by Lemma 2 and serves the maximum possible number of users given a certain number of storage nodes n.
III. COMMUNICATION-EFFICIENT DSSP
In this section, we derive a lower bound on the communication complexity of DSSPs, i.e., the amount of data that needs to be downloaded by users in order to reconstruct the secrets, and explore achievability of this bound.
For given parameters m and n as the number of users and storage nodes, respectively, a DSSP with minimum communication complexity C defined in (4) is called a communicationefficient DSSP. It is assumed that m ďˆn tn{2u˙, as in (8) . Otherwise, by Lemma 1 and (6) a DSSP does not exist.
A certain class of DSSPs, called tight DSSPs, defined as follows, is useful to derive lower bounds on the communication complexity and to construct communication-efficient DSSPs. This will be shown in Lemma 3.
Definition 2: We say a DSSP is a tight DSSP (T-DSSP) if every user downloads exactly one F q -symbol from each node in its access set.
Note that, for example, every S-DSSP, defined in Section II, is a T-DSSP.
Lemma 3: For any DSSP with communication complexity C, there exists a T-DSSP with the same number of users and storage nodes, and communication complexityC such that C ď C.
Proof: For each user l, letÃ l Ă A l denote the set with the minimum size such that user l can reconstruct its secret s l by downloading data fromÃ l . Note that user l has to download at least one symbol from each node inÃ l . Therefore,
The security condition implies that @j, l P rms, j ‰ l :
otherwise user j would be able to reconstruct s l . LetÃ def " tÃ j : @j P rmsu which is a Sperner family.
We then construct a S-DSSP associated with the access struc-tureÃ which has communication complexityC " ř m j"1 |Ã j |. This follows from the fact that in a S-DSSP, each user downloads exactly one data symbol from the nodes in its access set. This together with (9) and recalling that a S-DSSP is also a T-DSSP complete the proof.
Note that the communication complexity of a T-DSSP depends only on its associated access structure. Let a k denote the number of subsets of size k in the access structure of the T-DSSP. Then its communication complexity is given by
Therefore, by Lemma 3, one can consider minimizing ř n k"1 ka k to find a communication-efficient DSSP provided that a Sperner family with such a k 's exists. To this end, we consider the following discrete optimization problem: 
Constraint (13) is set because a k 's must be non-negative. Constraint (14) is set because the sum of a k 's is equal to the total number of users m. Also, by (7), (15) is a necessary condition for existence of a Sperner family with a k subsets of size k. If such Sperner family exists for the solution of this optimization problem, then we will have a communication-efficient DSSP. Otherwise, the minimum objective function is a lower bound for the minimum communication complexity. Note that due to the reciprocity of the binomial coefficients, we have a k " 0 for all X n 2 \ ă k in the solution of this optimization problem.
The idea to solve the above optimization problem is to first solve a continuous version of this problem and then extract the solution for the discrete version from the solution for the continuous version. The details of this process can be found in [16] . Let C˚denote the minimum of the objective function in the above optimization problem. Suppose that C˚is achieved by the choice of ak , for k " 1, 2, . . . , tn{2u. It is shown in [16] that at most two of ak 's are non-zero. Furthermore, it is shown that if two non-zero ak 's exist, then their indices are consecutive. In particular, the solution is described as follows. Let i denote the largest integer such that n i˙ď m.
Then ai "
ai`1 "
and ak " 0, for k ‰ i, i`1. Also, the minimum possible objective function is
Following is the summary of this section's results. Theorem 4: For a given number of users m and storage nodes n, any T-DSSP with the following access structure A is a communication-efficient DSSP: A is a Sperner family that contains ai of i-subsets of rns and ai`1 of pi`1q-subsets of rns, where i is the maximum integer that satisfies (16) , and ai and ai`1 are as calculated in (17) and (18).
Proof: The theorem follows by (11) and the solution to the discrete optimization problem.
Corollary 5: If a Sperner family A as specified in Theorem 4 exists, then S-DSSPtA , nu is a communication-efficient DSSP. Otherwise, C˚, given in (19), is a lower bound for the minimum possible communication complexity.
IV. COMMUNICATION-EFFICIENT DSSP WITH OPTIMAL STORAGE OVERHEAD
In this section, we show how to construct DSSPs with optimal storage overhead. To this end, we propose methods to construct random seeds for each user by utilizing the secret shares of other users while guaranteeing the security condition. This is done in such a way that no external randomness is required and hence, the total size of data to be stored on storage nodes is equal to the total size of secrets. Furthermore, this method can be applied to the communication-efficient DSSP constructed in Section III thereby providing DSSPs that are optimal in terms of both communication complexity and storage overhead.
Let m "`n k˘f or some k, where m and n denote the number of users and storage nodes, respectively. Consider a system with the access structure A consisting of all k-subsets of rns. First, consider a straightforward protocol by independently applying Shamir's secret sharing method to each secret. Let p jl be chosen independently and uniformly at random from F q , for j P rms and l P rk´1s. Then, for j P rms, the polynomial P j pXq is defined as follows:
The evaluations P j pγ 1 q, ..., P j pγ k q, where γ i 's are fixed, are to be stored on nodes in A j , the access set of user j. In this protocol the storage overhead is k which is far from the optimal value of one, as stated in Section I-A.
In order to reduce storage overhead to the optimal value 1 we need to store only m symbols in the storage nodes instead of km symbols as in the straightforward approach. Therefore, the idea is to ensure that the evaluation of P j 's over the evaluation points γ i 's have significant overlaps with each other. In particular, we consider the following system of linear equations:
. . . P m pγ 1 q " y m P 1 pγ 2 q " y 2 , P 2 pγ 2 q " y 3 , . . . P m pγ 2 q " y 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . P 1 pγ k q " y k , P 2 pγ k q " y k`1 , . . . P m pγ k q " y k´1 (21) In this case the coefficients of P j pxq's are no longer arbitrarily selected but are determined according to this system of linear equations. In other words, no external randomness is required. Note that there are pk´1qm unknown variables p jl 's together with m unknown variables y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y m . In total there are km variables and km linear equations in (21). The system of linear equations in (21) can be rewritten as
where b kmˆ1 consists of p jl 's and y j 's, s 1 kmˆ1 consists of k copies of each s j , and A pkmqˆpkmq is the coefficient matrix of the system of linear equations (21).
For simplicity and ease of calculation, let γ i " γ i , for i " 1, 2, . . . , k, where γ is a primitive element of F q . Then the following lemma provides a sufficient condition for A being nonsingular.
Lemma 6: If pq´1q ffl im for i P rks, then the matrix A is non-singular. The proof is omitted due to space constraints, please see [16] for the proof.
Corollary 7: If the condition in Lemma 6 is satisfied, then (21) defines a one-to-one mapping between ps 1 , s 2 , . . . , s m q and py 1 , y 2 , . . . , y m q. Furthermore, the data symbols y j 's are i.i.d. and uniformly distributed.
Proof: Lemma 6 shows that given s j 's, there is a unique solution for y j 's. Furthermore, for given y j 's, (21) defines m interpolation equations of polynomials P j pxq of degree at most k´1, for which there exists a unique solution. The data symbols y j 's are i.i.d. and uniformly distributed since s j 's are i.i.d. and uniformly distributed.
Suppose that the condition in Lemma 6 is satisfied, e.g., when q ą km. Note that b contains all data symbols y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y m as its last m entries. Also, s 1 " K s, where K kmˆm contains k ones in each column. Let A 1 be a submatrix of A consisting of last m rows of A. Now we can write the encoding equation as follows:
Epsq " A 1 s 1 " A 1 Ks " Es,
where E def " A 1 K and is referred to as the encoding matrix. Note that by Corollary 7, there is a one-to-one mapping between s and y and hence, E is non-singular.
In order to have the optimal storage overhead every data symbol y j must be stored exactly in one storage node. In other words, we need to specify a certain storing matrix Z, defined in Definition 1, to serve this purpose while ensuring that each user has access to data symbols it needs to reconstruct its secret.
The set of equations in (21) implies that users are indexed in such a way that each one overlaps in k´1 data symbols, out of the total k symbols it needs to reconstruct its secret, with the next user. Thus, in order to construct Z with the access structure A consisting of all k-subsets of rns, the k-subsets must be ordered, in a circular way, such that every two consecutive subsets have k´1 elements in common. This is possible and is done by using the revolving door algorithm [17] . The output of this algorithm can be written as a sequence i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i m , where i j P rns, and every k consecutive i j 's denote one of the k-subsets of rns which serves as a certain user's access set. The dealer stores y j in the storage node i j , for j P rms. In other words, the storing matrix Z nˆm is specified as follows:
for j " 1, 2, . . . , m,
The access set of user j is
where the indices are are modulo m, i.e., i m`l " i l . This implies that user j can read y j , y j`1 , . . . , y j`k´1 . It then interpolates the polynomial P j such that P j pγq " y j , P j pγ 2 q " y j`1 , . . . , P j pγ k q " y j`k´1 , for which there exists a unique solution. Then s j " P j p0q is reconstructed. This shows the correctness of the algorithm. Also, since each y j is stored exactly once, m F q -symbols are stored at storage nodes in total. This shows the optimality of the storage overhead in this protocol. In the following lemma, a sufficient condition for the security condition, as specified in (2), is determined.
Lemma 8: If a protocol satisfies the correctness condition, the data symbols at the output of its encoder are mutually independent, and its access structure is a Sperner family, then the protocol satisfies the security condition, specified in (2). The proof is omitted due to space constraints, please see [16] for the proof.
Theorem 9: Let m "`n k˘f or some k ď X n 2 \ , and q´1 does not divide im, for i P rks. Then the bundle of i) Access structure A consisting of all k-subsets of rns, ii) Encoding function E as stated in (23), iii) Storing matrix Z nˆm specified in (24), iv) m identical decoding functions D, where D is pk, kq Shamir's secret decoder, is a communication-efficient DSSP with optimal storage overhead.
Proof: By Lemma 6 the matrix A defined in (22) is non-singular and the encoding function in (23) is well-defined. The correctness is established by the particular choice of Z nˆm specified in (24) using the revolving door algorithm. This also specifies the decoding function D applied to y j , for each user j. Also, by Corollary 7 y j 's are i.i.d. and then, Lemma 8 is invoked to establish the security condition, specified in (2) . Therefore, the proposed protocol satisfies all the conditions of a DSSP. It is communication-efficient by Theorem 4. Also, since it stores exactly m F q -symbols in the storage nodes, it achieves the optimal storage overhead 1.
One interesting case of Theorem 9 is when we want to serve the maximum possible number of users m "`n t n 2 u˘f or a given n, as stated in Section II. In this case, we have a communicationefficient DSSP with optimal storage overhead that also serves the maximum possible number of users. Remark. The construction complexity of the proposed protocol is dominated by calculating the inverse matrix A´1. The complexity of a straightforward Gaussian elimination method for inverting the matrix A is Opk 3 m 3 q. However, this needs to be done only once to construct the storing matrix Z and then it can be fixed for encoding purposes. A straightforward implementation of the encoding process E, specified in (23), results in a run-time complexity Opm 2 q.
In [16] we propose an alternative method for constructing DSSPs with nearly optimal storage overhead while the conditions on m, n, q, as stated in Theorem 9, are removed. This is shown to result in more efficient construction and encoding algorithms at the expense of negligible increment in communication complexity and storage overhead.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK In this paper we considered a distributed secret sharing system consisting of a dealer, n storage nodes, and m users. The dealer aims at securely sharing a specific secret s j with user j via storage nodes, in such a way that no user gets any information about other users' secrets. Given a certain number of storage nodes we find the maximum number of users that can be served in such system. Also, lower bounds on minimum communication complexity and storage overhead are characterized in terms of n and m. Then we propose distributed secret sharing protocols, under certain conditions on the system parameters, that attain these lower bounds thereby providing schemes that are optimal in terms of both the communication complexity and storage overhead.
There are several directions for future work. In this paper, the problems of designing access structure, i.e., which nodes each user has access to, and the coding problem, i.e., how to encode and decode secrets, are considered jointly. An interesting direction for future work is to separate these two problems and consider designing efficient coding schemes given a certain access structure. Note that the result of Section IV for achieving the optimal storage overhead of 1 highly relies on the assumption that the vector of secrets is full entropy. Another interesting problem is to explore whether the same proposed construction techniques can be used in more general cases when the secrets are not necessarily uniformly distributed or a new methodology is needed to deal with such cases.
